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Sharing information among communities can result in more informed decisions 
being made faster. Information sharing involves the flow of unclassified and classified 
information, and consequently should be carefully engineered to avoid flow-based 
mistakes such as creating covert channels inadvertently.   This thesis uses misuse cases to 
identify such misuses of a sharing system. We show that an appropriate distributed role-
based access control model imposed upon information brokers can prevent enumerate 
misuse cases. We use the North Korean nuclear proliferation as a case study to elucidate 
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The purpose of this thesis is to develop secure information sharing for coalition 
environments.  A coalition environment refers to the need to share information between 
two or more communities of interest. Sharing information among communities can result 
in better and faster decision making. After the attacks on the United States on September 
11, 2001 (9/11), the U.S. and its allies began to broaden the sharing of information 
among government and nongovernmental organizations. To date, the U.S. government 
still lacks a dynamic, decentralized network for sharing and analyzing information. The 
sharing of information between relevant agencies at different levels of government is still 
dependent on multiple systems with limited or no ability to communicate with each other 
and is still constrained by institutional and technical barriers. Fragments of data collected 
by different agencies are likely to remain in different places with no way to find them and 
therefore no way to make sense of what is happening. Because users from several 
communities want to use the same information at the same place, the distribution of 
information can be a critical problem in a role-based access control model. In order to 
solve this problem, the thesis introduces the concept of distributed role-based access 
control (dRBAC) and the information broker (IB) as security-enhanced access control 
policy. This thesis explores the tenets of the information broker,1 a highly trustworthy 
agent in charge of distributing information from repositories in a multilevel security 
(MLS) context. Moreover, the thesis introduces the relationship between local and global 
information brokers.  
As the environment of inter-community information exchange is decentralized 
and increased, security has become a significant problem. Sharing information could 
involve controlling information flow between the entities by means of the security policy. 
However, security policy does not resolve all the security problems of information 
                                                 
1 C. R. MacDaniel, and M. L.Tardy, "Role-Based Access Control for Coalition Partners in Maritime 







sharing. Before implementing a shared information system, one must consider the 
security aspect of information flow within the coalition environment.  Early consideration 
improves the developer’s ability to build the right policy and requirements into the 
information system. This thesis introduces misuse cases for making secure-enhanced 
information sharing. Misuse cases help reveal the security risks of information sharing 
and what use cases can help to mitigate those risks. 
In addition, the thesis presents a scenario involving detection of North Korean 
nuclear weapons. The scenario is used to illustrate the implementation of dRBAC with 
IBs to achieve secure information sharing. 
The first step in this approach is to decompose the mechanism of information 
sharing. Information sharing can have several sub-functions, such as (1) identifying users, 
(2) checking location of information, and (3) providing requested information. Next, a 
unified modeling language (UML) for misuse cases for secure requirements of the 
system.2 Misuse cases model undesirable behaviors of the system, such as a disgruntled 
system administrator who inserts a logic bomb into an organization’s information system. 
Misuse cases allow the creation of a new model of secure information sharing with 
dRBAC.  
Chapter I provides background information on the North Korean nuclear weapons 
problem, the information broker, and several theories relevant to the application such as 
RBAC, dRBAC, and misuse cases for decomposing and composing secure requirements. 
Chapter II introduces a decomposition of functions in information sharing. Chapter III 
covers the maintenance of the decomposition and complementary misuse cases for 
security requirements. Chapter IV demonstrates the approach with a realistic hypothetical 
scenario. Chapter V provides conclusions and possible areas for future research. 
 
 
                                                 
2 G. Sindre and A. L. Opdahl, "Eliciting Security Requirements by Misuse Cases," Proc. 37th Conf. 








This thesis addresses the challenge of providing information sharing in a coalition 
environment setting in which members of the coalition and the roles they play are in 
constant flux. Information sharing within coalition environments is needed to counter 
threats to national security. Terrorism, for instance, knows no borders. To obtain a 
common operating picture (COP) to counter threats takes cooperation among nations, in 
addition cooperation between the public and private sectors, and with different degrees of 
need to share. However, suppose that a hacker in North Korea wants to interrupt the 
sharing of information between coalition partners. The thesis uses misuse cases to 
describe the risks when coalition states want to exchange information. Although members 
are in an alliance, they might be unfamiliar with the opposition, as in the case of the U.S. 
and China, countries that do not want to show their information to each other. Neither 
case guarantees the fluid exchange of shared information.  
The thesis builds on the concept of the information broker as a wallet of dRBAC 
to facilitate communication between allies.  The information broker handles requests by 
users to access repositories of information. The user does not have a need to know what 
repositories are available, or which repositories supplied the answer to the user’s query; 
that is, the information broker maintains the anonymity of the repositories. The thesis 
treats the dRBAC model as an access controller of the information broker. There is a 
variety of vulnerabilities to information flow in a multilevel secure system environment 
such as a hacker’s interception of information flow. Therefore, consideration of security 
in the model is essential to protect against the vulnerabilities.  
1. North Korea's Nuclear Weapon Program 
The nuclear weapon problem has arisen among nations because nuclear weapons 
create environmental, political and social problems such as radioactive contamination and 
foreign policy challenges. For over ten years, North Korea has been the focus of global 
concern about nuclear proliferation. Recently, North Korea declared that it possesses 







weapon. In response to this proliferation of nuclear weapons, six neighboring nations met 
in Beijing, China and adopted a declaration. However, North Korea has not complied 
with the resolution from the six-party talks. The thesis therefore assumes that the 
detection of a nuclear weapon is a possible scenario. 
a. Detection of North Korean Nuclear Weapons 
This scenario is built on a weapon detection problem involving North 
Korea. North Korea poses a threat to North America, Europe, and Asia in this scenario. 
The scenario assumes that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is detected by a 
military intelligence agency. 
In the first step of the scenario, the Republic of Korea (ROK) detects 
suspicious objects in North Korea and informs the United Nations (UN) of that fact. In 
the second step, the members of the UN Security Council verify the fact that North Korea 
has a veiled nuclear weapon, based on information from repositories in ROK, China and 
the U.S., and makes contingency plans to solve the problem. The last step in the scenario 
demonstrates how to support each ally in accomplishing the operation by sharing 
information. 
2. Need to Share Security Policy  
Before 9/11, those holding classified data applied the "need to know" model when 
considering information sharing. Since 9/11, there has been a call for improved 
information sharing, which has resulted in "need to share."  
"Need to know" and "need to share" are not parallel terms. "Need to know" is 
often used as a content-producer label to mark data assets with the assertion that the data 
should not be shared unless the user/consumer meets certain criteria. However, "need to 
share" is a concept, a precept and an objective. So many data assets are created; they need 







Sharing information can facilitate better, faster decision-making at all levels of 
government. It has several key features.3   
Shared information comes from a decentralized network. It sends and 
pulls information from all participants in counterterrorism efforts, from 
local law enforcement officers to senior policy makers. In addition, 
sharing information is a hybrid of technology and policy. The information 
sharing system uses currently available technology to share and protect the 
information that flows through it. When paired with clear guidelines, it 
could determine the collection, use and retention of information, and who 
should have access to information; it can both empower and constrain 
intelligence officers, and provide effective oversight. In addition, sharing 
information allows for vertical and horizontal coordination and 
integration. Information flows not just up the chain of command, but also 
horizontally, to the edges of the system. Finally, sharing information 
enables analysts, law enforcement agents and other experts to find others 
with common concerns and objectives and to meet in informal "virtual" 
teams to exchange information and ideas. 
3. The Information Broker 
There are many advantages to “need to share.” However, sharing information also 
produces the “information sharing paradox.” If a coalition member does not want to share 
everything with the others, the member cannot ask anyone any questions. Then how is a 
member able to find something? To solve this paradox, the information broker is 
introduced.  
The information broker is an information management controller in the 
information exchange system who acts as an intermediary between the requester of the 
information and the data repository. The information broker provides the data and at the 
same time shields the source of that data from the requester. In other words, the 
information broker encapsulates the data or the request under its own name and thereby 
maintains the confidentiality of the requestor and the repository. 
 This is a black box approach that can satisfy the data requests and protect the 
source. The information broker is based on the dRBAC model. By using dRBAC, the 
                                                 
3 James X. Dempsey."Moving from 'Need to Know' to 'Need to Share:' A Review of the 9-11 








information broker can control the distribution of information and authenticate personnel. 
The information broker is intended to be a highly trustworthy component of a system, 
responsible for dealing with a myriad of clearances, classifications, and compartments.  
4. Role-based Access Control 
Role-based access control (RBAC) is a means for controlling access to computer 
resources by associating access permissions with roles. Users are given roles to help 
simplify the management and enforcement of access control policies. The genesis of 
RBAC can be traced to the emergence of multi-user and multi-application on-line 
systems. The dRBAC model described here is based on the role-based access control 
principle. The assignment and membership principle is central to simplifying the 
management of permissions. 
With RBAC, access decisions are based on individual users' roles in an 
organization. Users take on assigned roles such as the Republic of Korea's National 
Intelligence Service (NIS) observers and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
investigators. The process of defining roles should be based on a thorough analysis of 
how an organization operates and should include input from a wide spectrum of users in 
the organization. 
The case model of RBAC consists of a user, a role, a session, and permission. A 
user in this model is a human. A role is a job function or a duty within some organization. 
A NIS agent searching for some information associated with an event is an example. A 
session occurs when an issuer activates some subset of roles to which he or she belongs. 
Permission is a particular model of access granted to one or more objects in the system. 
The RBAC model captures the following types of relationships: many-to-many 
permissions to role assignment and many-to-many users to role assignment. A function 
maps each session to a single user. Each session also gets mapped to a set of roles. 
Hierarchies are also a part of RBAC: they structure roles to reflect an 








relationship, which means that they are reflexive (role inherits its own permission), 
transitive, and anti-symmetric. In short, a subject may have multiple simultaneous 










Figure 1.   Hierarchical RBAC4 
 
5. Distributed Role-based Access Control 
dRBAC is a scalable, decentralized trust-management and access control 
mechanism for systems that span multiple administrative domains. The development of 
dRBAC was motivated by the problem of controlling access to resources in a coalition 
environment. A coalition environment might be commercial, in which corporations from 
several nations work together to achieve a common goal. The entities must cooperate to 
share the subset of their protected resources necessary to the coalition while at the same 
time protecting the resources that they do not want to share. 
                                                 
4 Figure 1 is drawn from D. F. Ferraiolo, R. Sandhu, S. Gavrila, D. R. Kuhn and R. Chandramouli. 
“Proposed NIST standard for role-based access control. ACM Transactions on Information and System 







The growth of distributed systems faces a variety of challenges in a coalition 
environment.5  
1. Dynamic coalition environments have to provide organizations and allies 
with the authorization of resources at varying levels of access to interact. 
2. Established trust relationships must be monitored over their lifetime to 
track the status of revocable credentials. 
3. Credentials that authorize a desired trust relationship must be distributed 
automatically to those who require them. 
Traditional approaches to employing RBAC in information systems rely on a 
central trusted computing base administered by a single authority. However, dRBAC is 
distinguished from previous approaches because it combines RBAC and trust-
management systems to create a system that offers both administrative ease and a 
decentralized scalable implementation.6 
1. Third party delegations allow an authorized entity to delegate roles created 
by another entity by referring directly to the role originator’s namespace. 
2. Values attributed supports another control of access right when supporting 
varying levels of access for the same resource. 
3. Continuous monitoring allows dRBAC to guarantee validity of established 
trust relationships over the lifetime of prolonged interactions. 
These three features of dRBAC enable the construction of a trust management and 
access control system. 
Delegations are published, validated, updated and revoked using dRBAC wallets7 
as a part of the information broker. This wallet is similar in function to PKI certificates 
and can store many delegations. In addition, for credential management, the wallet has 
                                                 
5 Eric Freudenthal, Tracy Pesin, Lawrence Port, Edward Keenan, and Vijay Karamcheti. "dRBAC: 
Distributed Role-Based Access Control for Dynamic Coalition Environments" (TR2001-819), Proceedings 
of the Twenty-second IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS), Vienna, 
Austria, 2002, 411-420. 
6 Freudenthal et al., 412. 







features such as discovery tags and proof monitoring. Discovery tags include an Internet 
address identifying authorized wallet, wallet’s name, time-to-live, and search flag. 
Through discovery tags, dRBAC establishes the trust relationships between wallets 
and/or data repositories. Another significant feature is the proof monitor. Proof monitors 
register delegation subscriptions with trusted wallets for each delegation in the proof. 
This proof monitor provides for the integration of all the proofs of authentication. 
C. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
1. Misuse Case 
A misuse case is defined as a special kind of use case, describing behavior that the 
system/entity owner does not want to occur.8 A misuse case has all the same properties as 
an ordinary use case. Given this, who handles the misuse cases? The answer is a mal-
actor, a special kind of actor who initiates a misuse case. The mal-actor can be from 
inside or outside the system. A mal-actor can be a rogue or legitimate user.   Figure 2 












                                                 
8 G. Sindre and A. L. Opdahl, "Eliciting Security Requirements by Misuse Cases," Proc. 37th Conf. 







2. Relation between Use Cases and Misuse Case 
a. Include and Extend 
In the UML diagram, there are two relationships, namely, “include” and 
“extend.” When a base use case is needed to do an inclusion use case, the relation 
between the two use cases can be defined as “include.”  The “extend” relationship is used 
for a part of a use case that is optional system behavior. 
b. Threaten, Mitigate, Prevent and Detect 
In addition to the standard “include” and “extend” relations, security 
requirements introduce other relations. These are particularly interesting with respect to 
use cases involving misuse cases. They are called “mitigate,” “detect” and “prevent.” In 
contrast, in a relation that comes from misuse it is effective to use cases negatively. This 
relation is called “threaten.” 
• Threaten: The function provided by the misuse case where the arrow 
originates from a mis-actor and threatens the activation of the use case that 
the arrow is directed towards, at least in some cases. 
• Mitigate: The function provided by the use case that the arrow originates 
from that mitigates the activation of the misuse case that the arrow is 
directed towards, at least in some cases. 
• Prevent: The function provided by the use case that the arrow originates 
from that prevents the activation of the misuse case that the arrow is 
directed towards, at least in some cases. 
• Detect: The function provided by the use case that the arrow originates 
from that detects the activation of the misuse case that the arrow is 
directed towards, at least in some cases. 
3. Adaptation of Template for Misuse Case 
The template suggested by the Rational Unified Process (RUP) contains many of 







1.2 Actors, 2. Flow of events, and so on. Of course, this template is not unique. There are 
several other templates for use cases, but misuse cases require looking at not only a basic 
flow, like a use case, but also a second flow. In other words, the point is to see what 
fields are normally included in use case templates, and then to consider which of these 
would also be relevant for misuse case templates. Fields in a use case, such as name, 
basic path, and description, are relevant to both use cases and misuse cases. However, 
misuse cases assume exceptional events which go against behaviors of use cases. Table 1 
shows the template for misuse cases. 
Name Contents 
Misuse case Name Assign a name to the misuse case 
Actors Name of the mal-actor who provokes the misuse case. 
Brief description Summarize a misuse case scenario.  
Flow of events Describe sequentially the basic behavior following this misuse 
case. 
Alternative flow of 
events 
For misuse cases, this occupies a partial event in the basic flow. 
Alternative flow is also meaningful, although in a lesser way. 
The alternative path is considered when the basic misuse cases 
are interrupted by a use case. 
Precondition Describe conditions and backgrounds which are satisfied by 
triggering the misuse cases and can be ensured by the system 
itself.  
Assumption Describe conditions which must be true but which cannot be 
guaranteed by the system itself. 
Worst case threat Describe the outcome if the misuse succeeds. If the misuse case 
has alternative paths, often this condition will be or contain a 
disjunction to describe slight variations in outcome. 
Capture guarantee Describe the outcome guaranteed by whatever prevention path 
is followed. If no prevention path is followed, one might 
alternatively formulate a wanted prevention guarantee, 
expressing what one would want the system to achieve with 
respect to the attempted misuse, but without stating how. 
Related business 
rules 
Describe what business rules are broken by each misuse case.  
Potential misuse 
profile 
Some kinds of misuse are most likely to be performed by intent 
whereas other may happen accidentally, for example. Some 
require insiders or people with enormous technical skill, while 









This field lists the various stakeholders and their motivations. 
For misuse cases this slot is even more important. In this field, 
risks can simply  be described textually. 
Scope This field represent the scope of modeling 
 
Table 1.   The Template for Misuse Case  
 
4. Non-functionality in Security Requirements 
To develop a system, it is first necessary to specify the requirements for the 
system. So far, the thesis has looked at positive aspects of functions in requirements. But 
today such one-sided approaches to the functions represented by use cases limit 
viewpoints on security, reliability and so on. Therefore, the thesis employs a misuse case, 
which is the negative form of a use case, to document and analyze the security of the 
system. Alexander defines a misuse case as a use case with hostile intents.9 In addition to 
using misuse cases, one can elicit the protective requirements against negative aspects, 
the so-called security requirements. Security requirements exist because people and the 
negative agents they create pose real threats to systems. Employing misuse cases and use 
cases to model and analyze scenarios in systems under design can improve security by 
helping to mitigate threats. In other words, both use and misuse cases can include 
subsidiary cases of their own kind, but their relationships to cases of the opposite kind are 
not simple inclusion. Instead, misuse cases threaten use cases with failure, and 
appropriate use cases can mitigate known misuse. Table 2 is extracted from Alexander’s 





                                                 
 9 I. Alexander, "Misuse Cases: Use Cases with Hostile Intent," IEEE Software, January/February 2003,  
58-66. 








Table 2.   Relationship Between Misuse Cases and Use Cases11  
 
As illustrated in Table 2, misuse cases can be threats to use cases. For example, 
the misuse case called “intercept information” can hinder a use case called “send a 
message” from delivering information. On the other hand, some use cases reduce the 
threats of misuse cases. For instance, a use case, “check abnormal network,” protects 
from the undesirable behavior of a mal-actor such as a denial-of-service (DoS) attack. 
Here, one cannot miss that the relations between misuse cases and use cases helps to 
elicit so-called non-functional requirements. Misuse cases can document the types of 
nonfunctional or quality requirements that engineers often call the "-ilities": reliability, 
maintainability, portability and so on. 
Exception handling with a use case describes how the system will respond to an 
undesirable event. Of course, one can employ simple requirement templates to elicit 
exceptions. But misuse case analysis is also a good way to discover possible exceptions. 
Misuse case analysis can be a more powerful technique than simply stepping through a 
template of thinking about exceptions, for several reasons. The analysis involves 
inverting the problem, taking the negative point of view of use cases, playing games for 
eliciting misuse cases, visual presentations and so on. In conclusion, products of 
use/misuse-case analysis that can contribute to effective test planning include specific 
failure modes, security threats, and exception-handling scenarios. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Alexander.  
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 Case Type Use Case Misuse Case 
Use Case Includes Threatens Target 


































II. DECOMPOSITION OF INFORMATION SHARING 
A. METHODS OF DECOMPOSITION 
Scenarios specified in UML use cases do not capture misuses of systems. Thus, it 
is necessary to proactively create misuse cases so that requirements for dealing with 
misuses of a system can be developed. For example, assume that there is a use case 
named “log on.” Many misuse cases can threaten the use cases in several ways such as 
“intercept password or ID,” “DoS attack,” “change user profile” and so on. But one 
cannot recognize when the use case has a problem or where one protects from misuse 
cases. Therefore, it is necessary to examine use cases in detail. When high-level use cases 




















Referring to Figure 3, when high-level use cases are decomposed into detailed 
sub-use cases, there will be sub-relationships such as “include” and “extend.” This thesis 
follows the decomposition approach mentioned by Pauli et al.12  
1. Identify candidate cases from textual description. 
2. Create initial textual descriptions for each. 
3. Identify and model relationship such as “include” and “extend.” 
4. Identify and model appropriate actor assignment. 
The first step is to identify candidate cases from steps in the textual description of 
the higher level case. If more details are needed about each step, or if the case does not 
describe simple behavior, then the step will be chosen to be a decomposed use case. 
Because future steps rely on the textual step of the decomposed use cases, a textual 
description is immediately created for these decomposed cases. One then identifies and 
models “include” and “extend” relationships. The process for identifying and modeling 
“includes” relationships is necessary so that shared behaviors among the decomposed 
cases can be accurately and consistently identified and modeled. In addition, the same 
general process is used for the “extends” relationship to support the textual descriptions 
by identifying the details of the relationship. 
B. DECOMPOSITION OF INFORMATION SHARING 
This chapter examines the decomposition of a use case. “Sharing information” is 
chosen as a main use case. A use case “sharing information” as mentioned above, is 
concerned with all kinds of information exchange between the requestor and the relevant 
repository. Sharing information has several features. It could identify whether the 
requestor is authenticated or not; it could search for a database relevant to the requestor’s 
query; it could provide information if it finds a match for the query. If there is data 
related to the request in several repositories, the requestor can receive the data from 
several repositories. Table 3 shows the flow of events in “sharing information.” 
                                                 
12 J. Pauli and D. Xu. “Integrating Functional and Security Requirements with Use Case 
Decomposition,” 11th IEEE International Conf. on Engineering of Complex Computer Systems. Palo Alto, 








Use case Name Sharing Information 
Actors Requestor 
Brief description A requestor wants to get information from a coalition member. 
The requestor asks the information broker (IB) to find the 
information. The IB verifies the identification of the requestor, 
and then looks for the database relevant to the request in the IB 
proxy. After finding the database, it returns information from 
the repository. 
Flow of events 1. The requestor requests information to the IB. 
2. The IB identifies the requestor.  
3. If the IB verifies the requestor, it begins finding 
databases from its proxy. 
4. The IB finds the databases relevant to the request. 
5. The IB returns the information from the repositories.  
Alternative flow of 
events 
When the IB does not identify the requestor,  
1. The IB shows “access denied” message to the requestor and 
disconnects the network communication. 
Precondition The information broker must have a user’s profile. 
The information broker must have a user’s ID and password. 
The information broker must have the user’s public key. 
Post-condition The information broker creates a session for the user. 
 
Table 3.   Specification of Sharing Information  
 
1. Identify Requestor 
Before a requestor asks for information from the information broker (IB), the 
requestor must authenticate his or her identity. These procedures precede all other steps. 
The IB has the IB user’s profile which the IB user has already registered. First, the 
requestor logs on and authenticates to the local IB with his or her ID and password. The 
IB searches for the user profile and checks to see whether the user profile matches the ID 
and password. After the IB verifies the user’s identity, the IB searches for the user’s 
subject key in the IB subject key repository. If the IB finds the user’s subject, the new 
session is created as a trust credential. When the user’s session is created, the IB checks 
the expiration date for the subject key because the subject is only valid prior to the 








Use case Name Identify Requestor 
Actors Requestor 
Brief description For using the information broker, a user must log on to the IB. 
The IB has a procedure to give a grant to the requestor to access 
the IB. The user first puts in his ID and password. The ID and 
password have to be in the access list in the IB before the user 
tries to log on to the IB. Then the IB finds the requestor’s 
subject key for verification. If the IB verifies the requestor, the 
IB creates a one time session for the user. 
Flow of events 1. The requestor enters his ID and password when the IB 
displays the log-on screen.  
2. The IB checks the user profile which was stored in the 
user profile database. 
3. The IB finds the matched user ID based on user input. 
4. The IB finds the matched user password based on the 
user input. 
5. After checking a basic profile, the IB finds the user's 
subject key from the IB key storage. 
6. The IB creates a session for the requestor and maintains 
the session until termination of the session.  
Alternative flow of 
events 
When the IB does not identify the requestor,  
1. The IB shows “access denied” message to the requestor and 
disconnects the network communication. 
Precondition The information broker must have a user’s profile. 
The information broker must have a user’s ID and password. 
The information broker must have the user’s public key. 
Post-condition The information broker creates a session for the user. 
 
Table 4.   Specification of a Use Case: Identify Requestor 
 
2. Located Repository Check 
After establishing the session, the requestor inputs a query to the IB. Based on the 
query, the IB searches for the relevant information with the database proxy. After 
receiving the query from the IB user, the IB analyzes the query and classifies the result of 










Use case Name Locate Repository Check 
Actors Requestor 
Brief description The information broker searches for database based on the 
requestor’s query.  
Flow of events 1. The information broker user starts to search the database 
on the basis of the requestor’s query. 
2. The IB analyzes the query from the requestor. 
3. The IB checks the analyzed query to determine whether 
the query is in the taxonomy of data classification.  
4. If the IB finds the matched database, the IB sets up the 
connection to the repositories.  
Alternative flow of 
events 
When the information broker cannot find appropriate 
classification from the query, 
1. The information broker displays the message “specify 
your query based on information taxonomy.” 
2. The information broker returns the display to the 
querying screen.  
When the local IB cannot find database associated with the 
query, 
1. The local IB forwards the query to the global IB. 
2. If the global IB finds the local IB with a database 
associated with the query, the global IB returns the 
address to the local IB. 
Precondition 1. The information broker must have the user’s session. 
2. The information broker must have the user’s profile. 
3. The information broker must have the system of classifying 
tags. 
Post-condition 1. The global or local IB returns the database address to the local 
IB. 
 
Table 5.   Specification of a Use Case: Locate Repository Check 
 
3. Provide Requested Information 
After finding databases associated with the query from the requestor, the IB 
connects to the repositories. The IB checks the permission of the requestor to determine 
whether the requestor has the correct permission. In order to verify the permission, the IB 









gathers the fragments of information from several repositories. Then the IB encapsulates 
the fragments with the IB key, after which the IB supplies the information to the 
requestor.  
Use case Name Provide Requested Information 
Actors The repository, the requestor 
Brief description After finding the database associated with the requestor, the 
repository verifies the requester's permission to determine 
whether the requestor can receive the data. If the permission of 
the requestor is authenticated, the repository hands over the 
requested information.  
Flow of events 1. The IB finds the database relevant to the requestor’s 
query. 
2. The IB verifies that the requestor has permission to 
receive the data consistent with policy. 
3. If it turns out that the requestor has permission to receive 
the data, the repository approves granting the data to the 
IB. 
4. The IB forwards the data to the requestor.  
Alternative flow of 
events 
When the IB cannot verify the requestor's permission to receive 
the data, the IB displays message “access denied.” 
1. The IB disconnects the connection to the requestor. 
Precondition 1. The information broker must have the user’s session. 
2. The information broker must have the user’s profile. 
3. The information broker must have the system of classifying 
tags. 
Post-condition 1. The IB hands over the requested data to the requestor. 
 
Table 6.   Specification of a Use Case: Provide Requested Information  
 
C. THE UNIFIED MODELING LANGUAGE BASED ON FUNCTIONS OF 
INFORMATION SHARING 
After decomposition of “information sharing,” the process of use case modeling is 
extended. Figures 4 and 5 show the UML diagrams for decomposition of the use case 
“sharing information.” The requestor logs on and authenticates to the IB. The IB checks 
the user’s identity and creates a session. Next, the user inputs the query to the IB, which 







permission to view data based on the user’s role in accordance with policy. Then the IB 
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III. SECURITY PERSPECTIVE ON SHARING INFORMATION 
A. ANALYSIS OF MISUSE CASES IN SHARING INFORMATION 
The IB provides the requested information to the requestor. Each requestor has 
both an ID and a password to access to the IB, and the IB stores a requestor’s subject key. 
In addition, the IB is responsible for searching repositories on behalf of the user’s role 
and permission. If the IB finds relevant repositories and verifies the permission from the 
requestor, it would return the data from the data repository to the requestor. Here, one can 
find some of the security vulnerabilities, because information should be shared although 
it may not be secure. “Information sharing” does not have sub-use cases that protect from 
the foreign access or attack. In other words, misuses from mal-actors can make the IB 
unavailable, or mistakes of actors can trigger unexpected results. 
A misuse case “prevent information sharing” is used as a counterpart to 
“information sharing.” “Prevent information sharing” includes a set of behaviors from a 
mal-actor such as impersonating the requestor, preventing the IB from finding an 
information database, preventing the IB from verifying the permission of information, 
























Misuse case Name Prevent Information Sharing 
Actors A hacker 
Brief description A hacker has several ways to interfere with sharing information between 
the requestor and the opposite side. He could impersonate the user to get 
information from the IB. He could prevent the IB from finding the 
location of database based on the requestor’s query. He could prevent the 
IB from verifying a permission of information based on the requestor’s 
role. He could interrupt the flow of information between the requestor 
and the repository. 
Flow of events 1. The hacker accesses the network between user sharing 
information. 
2. The hacker prevents the uses from sharing information 
a. He impersonates the user to get information from the IB. 
b. He prevents the IB from finding the location of the database 
based on the requestor’s query. 
c. He prevents the IB from verifying a permission of 
information based on the requestor’s role. 
d.  He interrupts the flow of information between the requestor 
and the repository. 
Alternative flow of 
events 
When a hacker fails to prevent from sharing information 
1. The hacker concentrates on breaking the information broker 
system. 
2. The hacker tries to contact an information broker's system 
administrator to intercept information. 
Precondition The networks linking the requestor, the IB, and the repositories is 
connected to the hacker’s network physically.  
Assumption Hackers have ability to analyze the signal and code. 
Worst case threat The hacker watches and controls the overall flow of information among 
the members sharing information. 
Capture guarantee To protect from the hacker’s interruption, use more secure and reliable 
techniques and policy. 
Related business 
rules 
The IB cannot guarantee to connect to the IB users. 
Potential misuse 
profile 
The hacker is good at hacking the network. 
Stakeholders and 
threat 
1 The information broker user 
1.1 Loss of trust between the information brokers. 
2 The information broker system 
2.1 Loss of confidence if security problems get publicized. 
3 Database 
1.1 Loss of confidence if information is publicized to a unauthorized 
person. 
Scope The entire information broker environment 























Figure 6.   Misuse Case Diagram as “Prevent Information Sharing” 
 
1. Impersonate Requestor 
In order to get information, as the first step of using the IB a requestor should log 
on and authenticate the IB. However, here one assumes that a hacker catches the 
exchange of identification information between the IB and a requestor, masquerades as 
the requestor, then receives access to the IB. A hacker could get the requestor’s 
information from the user’s computer or by spoofing the data packets between the IB and 
the requestor when the requestor tries to access the IB. Based on that information, the 
hacker obtains authentication to access the IB. Table 8 shows how a hacker can 















Brief description A hacker catches information from a requestor, then tries to access 
the IB. 
Flow of events 1. A hacker gets information from the requestor’s PC or by 
spoofing information between the IB and the requestor. 
2. The hacker analyzes the information and tries to access to 
the IB.  
3. The IB grants the hacker authorization to access the IB 
based on copied information. 
4. The hacker acts as if he is a requestor. 
Alternative flow 
of events 
When a hacker fails to impersonate a requestor 
1. The hacker concentrates on breaking the other 
information broker system. 
2. The hacker attacks the IB or the network by means 
such as DoS attack or spreading a virus so that the IB 
user cannot use the IB. 
3. The hacker prevents the IB from finding the location 
of information. 
Precondition The network between the IB and the IB user is connected to the 
hacker’s network physically.  
Assumption Hackers have the ability to analyze the signal and code. 
Worst case threat The hacker pretends to be a requestor and gets information from 
the IB. 
Capture guarantee To safeguard against a hacker’s impersonation, develop checking 
system for authentication. 
Related business 
rules 




The hacker has the skill to hack the network. 
Stakeholders and 
threat 
1 The information broker user 
1.1 Loss of trust between the information brokers. 
2 The information broker system 
2.1 Loss of confidence if security problems get publicized. 
3 Data Repository 
1.2 Loss of confidence if information is publicized to a 
unauthorized person. 
Scope The entire information broker environment 
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Figure 7.   Sequence Diagram of a Misuse Case: Impersonate the Requestor  
 
2. Prevent Finding Info Location 
After successfully logging on to the information broker, a requestor inputs a query 
to get information from the IB. The IB starts to search for databases relevant to the query. 
Assume that a hacker is trying to prevent the IB from finding the location of a database 
related to the requestor’s query. The first possible attack route is for the hacker to get the 
IP address of the IB and then break the proxy server storing the addresses of databases. In 
the second method, a hacker intercepts the query in the network and changes the query 
into what a hacker wants. Those interruptions prevent the IB from locating a database. 
Table 9 describes the misuse case “prevent finding info location.” Figure 8 depicts the 










Prevent finding info location 
Actors A hacker 
Brief description A hacker does not want the IB to locate a database. Therefore, a 
hacker tries to break the database proxy in the IB or intercepts a 
query from the requestor to the IB and changes the query. The 
requestor cannot receive data which the he wants. 
Flow of events 1. The hacker occupies the network between the IB and a 
requestor. 
2. The hacker penetrates the IB and finds a proxy in charge of 
database. 
3. The hacker injects malicious code or virus to break the 
proxy in order to change the user query. 
4. The IB user receives data which is different from what he 
requested from the IB. 
Alternative flow 
of events 
When a hacker fails to prevent the IB from finding databases 
matched the requestor’s query,  
1. The hacker concentrates on breaking the other 
information broker system. 
2. The hacker targets the IB or the network with DoS 
attack or virus to prevent the user from using the IB. 
Precondition 1. The network between the IB and the IB user is 
connected to the hacker’s network physically. 
2. The hacker occupies the network. 
Assumption Hackers have the ability to analyze the signal and code. 
Worst case threat The hacker breaks the proxy. As a result, nobody can use the IB. 
Capture guarantee To protect from the hacker's interception or penetration, use more 
secure access control policy. 
Related business 
rules 
The requestor cannot trust communication with the IB. 
Potential misuse 
profile 
The hacker has the skill to intercept the code and modify the code. 
Stakeholders and 
threat 
1 The information broker user 
1.1 Loss of trust between the information brokers. 
2 The information broker system 
2.1 Loss of confidence if security problems get publicized. 
Scope The entire information broker environment. 
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Figure 8.   Sequence Diagram of a Misuse Case: Prevent Finding Database 
 
3. Prevent from Verifying Permission 
After locating a database, the IB verifies the user's permission based on the user’s 
information and query. However, what if a hacker prevents the IB from verifying the 
permission to access the information? Exchanging information follows an access control 
policy. It could be mandatory access control (MAC) or discretionary access control 
(DAC). Here, the assumption is that this IB uses a DAC policy for flexibility of roles. 
DAC is based on the user’s identity and access control rules. DAC has the following 
features: (1) Users can protect what they own; (2) Owner may grant access to others; (3) 
Owner may define the type of access given to others. This reveals the security risks of 







owner from editing the type of access? Eventually, nobody can get permission to access 
data. Table 10 and Figure 9 shows a hacker preventing verification of permission to 
access data. 
Misuse case Name Prevent from Verifying Permission 
Actors A hacker 
Brief description A hacker does not want the IB to verify a permission to receive data 
from the repository. Therefore, the hacker masquerades an owner of 
data, then modifies the type of access of data. As a result, neither the 
requestor nor the original owner can use the data.  
Flow of events 1. The hacker occupies the network between the IB and a 
requestor. 
2. The hacker obtains the address of database. 
3. The hacker penetrates the database and finds the data matches 
what the requestor wants. 
4. The hacker masquerades an owner of data, then modifies the 
type of access of data. 
5. Neither the requestor nor the original owner from the 
repository can use the data. 
Alternative flow 
of events 
When a hacker fails to prevent the IB from verifying a 
permission of data from the repository 
1. The hacker concentrates on breaking the other 
information broker systems. 
2. The hacker interrupts the IB or the network using a DoS 
attack or a virus so that the IB user cannot use the IB. 
Precondition 1. The network between the IB and the IB user is connected 
to the hacker’s network physically. 
2. The hacker occupies the network. 
Assumption Hackers have the ability to analyze the signal and code. 
Worst case threat The hacker breaks the proxy. As a result, nobody can use the IB. 
Capture guarantee To protect from the hacker's interception or penetration, use more 
secure access control policy.   
Related business 
rules 
The requestor cannot trust communication with the IB. 
Potential misuse 
profile 
The hacker has a skill to intercept the code and modify the code. 
Stakeholders and 
threat 
1 The information broker user 
1.1 Loss of trust between the information brokers. 
2 The information broker system 
2.1 Loss of confidence if security problems get publicized. 
Scope The entire information broker environment 
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Figure 9.   Sequence Diagram of a Misuse Case: Prevent Verifying Permission 
 
4. Interrupt Flow of Information 
The main problem of sharing information comes from hacker attacks. Assume 
that a hacker tries to occupy the network between the IB and the IB user. Once the hacker 
has the ability to control the network, hacking is much easier. Table 11 and Figure 10 

















Interrupt Flow of Information 
Actors A hacker 
Brief description A hacker observes flow of information on the network and 
occupies the network. 
Flow of events 1. The hacker operates several servers to search for the 
network between the IB and the requestor. 
2. If the hacker finds the network, he analyzes the signal and 
code. 
3. The hacker breaks the code used in communicating 
between the IB and IB user. 
4. After analyzing the signal and code, the hacker tries to 
control the network. 
Alternative flow 
of events 
When a hacker fails to occupy the network,  
1. The hacker concentrates on breaking the other 
information broker systems. 
2. The hacker attacks the IB or the network using DoS 
attack or virus so that the IB user cannot use the IB. 
Precondition The network between the IB and the IB user is connected to the 
hacker’s network physically.  
Assumption Hackers have the ability to analyze the signal and code. 
Worst case threat The hacker totally views and controls the flow of information 
between the IB and the requestor. 
Capture guarantee To protect from the hacker attack, use a more secure and reliable 








The hacker has the skill to hack the network. 
Stakeholders and 
threat 
1 The information broker user 
1.1 Loss of trust between the information brokers. 
2 The information broker system 
2.1 Loss of confidence if security problems get publicized. 
3 Database 
3.1 Loss of confidence if information is publicized to a 
unauthorized person. 
Scope The entire information broker environment 
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Figure 10.   Sequence Diagram of a Misuse Case: Interrupt Flow of Information 
 
The thesis presents research on misuse cases over the operation of the IB, a 
requestor, and a data repository. Security risks are present in all information sharing 
procedures. For the flow of information, the proper timing for the exchange of 
information and keeping the integrity of information are important. However, misuse 
cases interfere with the timing and integrity of information communication between the 
IB and requestor. Hackers can intercept the flow of information in the network and 
modify data in accordance with their own intentions. The next section explores the 










B. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MISUSE CASES AND DRBAC USE CASES 
Misuse cases of “sharing information” have been described. Those misuse cases 
are concerned with preventing interference by a hacker. Figure 11 presents an integrated 
use cases and misuse cases diagram. The black-colored misuse cases threaten use cases of 
"information sharing."  
A hacker’s attack harms the IB directly. A hacker who already occupies the 
network between the IB and the requestor would be willing to control all the packets 
flowing in the network. He could see and modify the packets consistent with his own 
intent. In the worst case, the requestor would trust the modified data and make a plan 
based on the data. In summary, when the requestor wants to get information from the IB, 



































Figure 11.   Integrated Use Cases and Misuse Cases Diagram in “Sharing Information” 
 
To make the diagram clearer, identification numbers are assigned to each use case 
(UC) and misuse case (MU)  in Figure 11 and Table 12. Table 12 summarizes which 







sharing information depends on the networks among the IB, the requestor, and the 
repository, it is a loss for a use case “information sharing” if a hacker occupies the 
network. Therefore, some use cases for security over the misuse cases must be added.  
Threaten to => UC1 UC1.1 UC1.2 UC1.3 
MU1 Threatens    
MU1.1  Threatens   
MU1.2   Threatens  
MU1.3    Threatens 
MU1.4    Threatens 
 
Table 12.   Integrated Use Cases and Misuse Cases Diagram in Sharing Information 
 
C. SECURITY ENHANCED RECOMPOSITION OF SHARING 
INFORMATION 
The IB is concerned with information sharing. However, there is no way to 
protect from an external attack. Functions with use cases are decomposed in Chapter II 
and misuse cases are investigated at the beginning of Chapter III. As the assessment of 
the relationship between the misuse cases and the use cases shows, the IB might be at risk 
when a hacker attacks the IB. Therefore, use cases in charge of security over the misuse 
cases should be added, then the use cases should be recomposed and secured for more 
secure information sharing. 
First, a use case “authentication check” is added against a misuse case 
“impersonate requestor.” Authentication check is in charge of the user identification 
located in the information broker. Second, a use case “enforce access control policy” is 
added against a misuse case “prevent from verifying permission.” This secure use case is 
a major part of exchanging information with dRBAC. As mentioned in Chapter I, 
dRBAC has the advantages of solving the scalability problem and keeping data 







prevent hackers from conducting a changing permission attack. The third secure use case 
is “encrypt message.” This use case acts all over the network in the information sharing 
environment. This thesis focuses on describing this secure use case to prevent a hacker 
from changing the query and intercepting data packets between repositories and the IB. 
1. Authentication Check 
In order to protect a hacker from impersonating the requestor, a use case 
“authentication check” is added to help identify the user. Identification depends on user 
information such as who you are, what you have, and what you know. Even if a hacker 
copies the user information such as ID and password from the user's PC, this just satisfies 
the first and third conditions. But the second condition, what you have, cannot be proved. 
Therefore, the IB can deny the access from a hacker’s log-on trial. Because the solution is 
not approached technically, it is described below.  
Use case Name Authentication Check 
Actors The information broker 
Brief description A hacker who has copied the user information tries to log on the 
IB with the user’s ID and password. The IB sends the embedded 
module to authenticate the input. The IB finds unique user 
information and judges an authentication. If it turns out that the 
approach is from unauthorized person, it shows the message 
“access denied.” 
Flow of events 1. A hacker hacks a user's PC. 
2. The hacker tries to log on the IB based on hacked ID and 
password. 
3. The IB sends the ID and password to the check-
authentication module. 
4. The IB finds matching unique information in the module, 
and judges whether the person is authorized. 
5. If the person does not verify the unique information, the 
IB regards the access as hacking. 
6. The IB denies the access. 
Precondition 1. The information broker must have the user’s session. 
2. The information broker must have the user’s profile. 
3. The information broker must have the system of classifying 
tags. 
Post-condition 1. The IB shows the message “access denied” 
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Figure 12.   Specification of a Secure Use Case: Authentication Check 
 
2. Enhance Secure Access Control Policy 
The dRBAC is chosen as a secure access control policy in secure use case 
“enhancing secure access control.” Security is enhanced with dRBAC, which delegates 
and proves authentications like RBAC but is superior because it is scalable. It is 
important to know how a repository grants permission to the requestor. This results from 
the delegation of rules. 
The dRBAC model shows three different types of delegation models: self-
certifying, third party, and assignment. The first two permit an entity to delegate 
permissions associated with a role, either in its own namespace or in another, while the 







role delegation is defined as signed certificates that extend access rights on some object 
to a subject: “[subject Æ object] issuer”, where object is a role, issuer is an entity, and 
subject is a role or an entity. Here, “Æ” means “has a permission of.” 
a. Self-certified Delegation: An issuer A grants role A.a to some subject. The 
role granted is defined within A’s name: “[subject Æ A.a]A” 
b. Assignment Delegation: Entity B grants some subject the right to delegate 
role A.a to others. The tick indicates that the Subject can further delegate 
the role. B and A may or may not be the same entity: “[subject Æ A.a’]B 
c. Third-Party Delegation: In third-party delegation, some issuer B exercises 
its right to delegate a role defined in A’s namespace. A and B are not the 
same entity: “[subject Æ A.a]B” 
For example, assume that Kim is an agent in the NIS and Bob is an agent in the 
CIA. The NIS agent Kim will take advantage of a coalition between NIS and CIA to 




1 [Kim → NIS.agent] NIS 
2 [NIS.agent → CIA.agent with CIA.picture = area 5027] Bob 
3 [Bob → CIA.agent ] CIA  
4 [CIA.agent → CIA.database with CIA.picture =’] CIA 
5 [CIA.database → CIA.access with CIA.picture = area 5027] CIA 
 
Table 14.   Delegations Supporting Kim’s Access to CIA Resource  
 
Delegation (1) identifies Kim as NIS.agent. Delegation (2) defines the coalition 
between NIS and CIA as set up by the IB, whose authorization for doing so is provided 














Use case Name Enhance Secure Access Control Policy 
Actors The information broker 
Brief description After finding the database associated with the requestor, the 
repository verifies a permission of the requester whether the 
requestor can receive the data or not. If the permission of the 
requestor is authenticated, the repository would hand over the 
requested information by dRBAC.  
Flow of events 1. The IB found the database relevant to the requestor’s 
query. 
2. The IB verifies that the requestor has the permission of 
the data by dRBAC policy. 
3. If it turns out that the requestor has a permission of the 
data, the repository approves granting the data to the IB. 
4. The IB forwards the data to the requestor. 
Alternative flow of 
events 
When the IB cannot verify the permission of the data the 
requestor has, 
1. The IB displays message to the requestor, “access 
denied.” 
2. The IB disconnects the connection to the requestor. 
Precondition 1. The information broker must have the user’s session. 
2. The information broker must have the user’s profile. 
3. The information broker must have the system of classifying 
tags. 
Post-condition 1. The IB hands over the requested data to the requestor. 
 























6. Find the DB
14. Send data with IB name
Provide Info
8. Trigger










Figure 13.   Sequence Diagram: Enforce Security Access Control Policy  
 
3. Encrypt Messages 
When a requestor sends the query to the IB, or the IB and the repository sends 
data related to the user’s query, it is important to maintain both the integrity and 
confidentiality of information flow. A hacker can intercept the packets passing between 
IB members and modify the data, increasing security risks. To protect from those kinds of 
attacks, a secure use case “encrypt message” is added. Table 16, Figure 13 and Figure 14 














Use case Name Encrypt Message 
Actors The information broker 
Brief description When the user inputs the query or data packets are moving 
among the IB members, the security risk is increased. Encrypting 
messages guarantees a secure network. 
Flow of events 1. The requestor inputs the encrypted query to the IB. 
2. The IB receives the message and analyzes the query and 
finds the database related to the encrypted message. 
3. After verification, the repository sends encrypted data. 
4. The IB re-encrypts the message with IB name. 
Precondition 1. The information broker must have the user’s session. 
2. The information broker must have the user’s profile. 
3. The information broker must have the system of classifying 
tags. 
Post-condition 1. The IB hands over the requested data to the requestor. 
 
Table 16.   Specification of a Secure Use Case: Encrypt message 
 
Requestor
<<Actor>> Repository<<Actor>>Verifying identification Provide Info
2. Check user
profile &











10. Find the DB
11. Verify
Permission
12. Send  
data
13. Send data with IB name
Search DB















<<Actor>> Repository<<Actor>>Verifying identification Provide Info
2. Check user
profile &










9. Find the DB
10. Verify
Permission







12. Send Encrypted Data
14. Try to intercept Data
15. Failure
 
Figure 15.   Sequence Diagram of “Encrypt Message”: Encrypt the Data 
 
D. SUMMARY 
Through decomposition and re-composition of use cases and misuse cases, a new 
model has been developed. Figures 16 and 17 present a sequence diagram and a use case 
diagram of misuse cases and secure-enhanced “sharing information” use cases. Table 17 
indicates the relationship between misuse cases and secure-enhanced use cases. SU1 
(Secure Use Case 1) “authentication check” detects the misuse case “impersonate 
requestor.” SU2 “enhancing access control policy” is concerned with dRBAC policy, 
which is used for exchanging information between users. SU3 “encrypt messages” also 












































































SU2 - Enhance 
Access Control policy

















 UC1 UC1.1 UC1.2 UC1.3 SU1 SU2 SU3 
MU1 Threatens       
MU1.1  Threatens   Mitigates   
MU1.2   Threatens   Mitigates  
MU1.3    Threatens   Mitigates 
MU1.4    Threatens   Mitigates 
 
Table 17.   The Relationship between Misuse Cases and Secure-enhanced dRBAC 
 
With added use cases for security, security risks, which are discovered by misuse 
cases, can be reduced. This approach is best used during the requirements specification 
and analysis phase of development for the IB system where use cases can be used to 
document the requirements. In addition, early consideration of security helps to assure the 
user will not make a mistake operating the IB. Moreover, if the IB has a problem with a 
function, the function can be traced and the problem found easily because all the dRBAC 







IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CASE STUDY 
A. MODEL OF SCENARIO IN DRBAC 
This section presents the flow of data and roles in a case study about the detection 
of nuclear weapons or technology enabling the production of nuclear weapons in North 
Korea. The flow of data and roles are described in Figure 18.  
 
< NIS Agent>




[info relate to CBR warfare]
< JCS Operat ion Off icer>
[info relates to An-Tung 
atmosphere]
CHINA




info relate to CBR warfare]
< Member in UN SC>
[Convert into evidence 
based on data]
IB< Observer in IAEA>[info in Sin-uiju relate to 
nuclear weapon site]
US AIS
[info relate to 
tracking data in Sin-uiju]
< Operat ion Planner 
in ROK NAVY>
[info relates to CBR 
warfare]
< Operat ion of f icer 
in CHINA ARMY >










Figure 18.   Flow of data and roles  
 
1. Background 
The case study is built on the weapon detection problem involving North Korea. 
North Korea poses a threat to North America, Europe, and Asia in this scenario, which 












2. Phase 1 – Reconnaissance and Detection 
a. Situation 
The ROK reconnaissance satellite, Uribyul, in orbit over North Korea, 
detects suspicious objects (e.g., launchers and other missile-related facilities) in the 
vicinity of the border area between North Korea and China known as Sin-uiju. Imagery 
from the satellite is sent to the Korean NIS. The pictures are studied by intelligence 
analysts. The analysts suspect that the site hosts nuclear weapons. 
 
• Actor 1.  Baek, a NIS agent in Seoul, has a user profile that authorizes 
access to data labeled SECRET and marked Law Enforcement Sensitive. 
• Actor 2.  Kim, a ROK Joint Chief of Staff ( JCS ) operations officer, has a 
user profile that authorizes assess to data labeled TOP SECRET. 
 
b. Scenario 
(1)  Step 1. The NIS agent (actor 1) logs on and authenticates to 
the IB. The NIS agent accesses a shared workspace, code-named Gasmask, established 
for data related to chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) warfare. This workspace 
includes data labeled SECRET, SECRET-NOFORN, Sensitive but Unclassified, and Law 
Enforcement Sensitive level. 
(2)  Step 2. The NIS agent rechecks satellite images in the 
workspace and finds an image of the territorial feature where nuclear weapons can be 
launched, in addition to images of launchers and other suspicious objects. 
(3)  Step 3. The NIS agent remembers seeing a similar territory on 
the CBR database of suspected launch sites and makes a query to the information broker 
requesting information relating to CBR warfare. The information broker returns images 
and analysis reports showing suspected CBR facilities at that site. (Because the database 







requests such data from the U.S.) The NIS agent downloads the files, which are labeled 
SECRET-Releasable China, and then posts them to the Gasmask shared workspace. 
(4)  Step 4. The ROK JCS operations officer (Actor 2) logs on and 
authenticates to the information broker. The operations officer makes a query to the 
information broker requesting the recently analyzed information about the air quality of 
Sin-uiju from the State Environment Protection Administration (SEPA- Chinese 
Environment Bureau) database in An-Tung, which lies on the Chinese side of the border 
near Sin-uiju.  The information broker returns the data about the atmosphere around An-
Tung that includes information on Sin-uiju. The operations officer downloads the data 
and analyzes it with regard to CBR warfare. 
(5)  Step 5. Based on the SEPA report on heightened levels of 
radiation in Sin-uiju, the ROK JCS operations officer suspects that nuclear weapons are 
hidden there. The officer creates the annotated graphic, classified SECRET-Releasable 
UN, and posts the analyzed data in the shared workspace. 
3. Phase 2 – Rechecking and Defense 
a. Situation 
The members of the UN Security Council recognize the possibility that 
nuclear weapons exist in North Korea. The UN Security Council directs IAEA observers 
to verify the graphical data on the Sin-uiju region from the shared workspace Gasmask. 
They discover abnormal air quality statistics indicative of the presence of nuclear 
material. The members of the UN Security Council prepare two contingency plans: (a) 
politically pressure North Korea to scrap the nuclear weapon missiles by itself; or (b) 
destroy the suspected nuclear missile launching site. For plan (b), the members request 
that the Minister of Defense in South Korea direct the ROK Navy Command to complete 
the mission.  
 
• Actor 3. James, a member of the UN Security Council, is directed to 
prepare for negotiations with North Korea. Actor 3 has a user profile that 







• Actor 4. John, an IAEA observer, is directed to check information on the 
possibility of North Korea possessing a nuclear weapon. Actor 4 has a 
user profile that authorizes access to data and information at TOP 
SECRET. 
• Actor 5. Park, a ROK Navy Command operations planner, is tasked with 
determining options for destroying the suspected nuclear weapon missile 
launching site near Sin-uiju. Actor 5 has a user profile that authorizes 
access to data labeled  TOP SECRET. 
b. Scenario 
(1)  Step 1.  The IAEA observer (actor 4) logs on and authenticates 
to the information broker. The observer makes a query to the information broker 
requesting recent data about the area near Sin-uiju. The information broker returns the 
following data from the Gasmask shared workspace: (a) the flame-grab image of the 
suspect region in North Korea; (b) the CBR warfare air quality statistics data file. 
(2)  Step 2.  The IAEA observer logs on and authenticates to the 
IB. The observer makes a query to the IB requesting the data relating to buildings under 
construction and tracking data for all of the vehicles near Sin-uiju in the most recent one-
year period. The IB returns the tracking data of the automatic identification system (AIS) 
and the locations of buildings under construction in the vicinity of Sin-uiju during 
previous months from data in U.S. Naval Intelligence databases. 
(3)  Step 3.  The IAEA observer analyzes and verifies the data. The 
observer informs the UN Security Council of the possibility that North Korea has nuclear 
weapons. 
(4)  Step 4.  The UN Security Council member (actor 3) makes a 
query to the information broker requesting evidence for use in negotiations with North 
Korea. The information broker finds the requested data in Gasmask and returns the data 
so that actor 3 can see it. Using the data, the member gathers information, converts it into 







(5)  Step 5.  The operations planner in the ROK Navy Command 
(actor 5) accesses the shared workspace Gasmask and examines the graphical plot of the 
Sin-uiju region. The planner simulates the possibility of mission failure. If the nuclear 
weapon explodes during the mission, the emission of radiation would directly affect An-
Tung. Therefore, the operations planner recommends that the People's Republic of China 
be informed of the hazard. Actor 5 also creates a mission for destroying the suspected site 
in Sin-uiju. 
(6)  Step 6.  The operations planner on ROK NAVY Command 
overlays the locations of the ROK Navy SEAL force operatinging the Yellow Sea. The 
operations planner creates a data set showing where the ROK Navy SEAL Force will 
deploy, marked SECRET-Releasable China. 
4. Phase 3 – Supporting Allies 
a. Situation 
The Minister of the ROK Defense informs the China Department of 
Defense of the potential threat. The Chinese defense ministry directs China Army 
Intelligence to (a) evaluate negative effects from failure of the mission; and (b) help the 
ROK Navy combatants escape safely. 
• Actor 6. Wang, an operations officer in China Army Intelligence, has a 
user profile that authorizes access to data and information found in a 
number of Chinese databases as well as ROK databases labeled SECRET-
Releasable China. 
b. Scenario 
(1)  Step 1.  The Chinese operations officer (actor 5) logs on and 
authenticates to the information broker. The operations officer makes a query to the 
information broker requesting the data of the locations in the vicinity of the Sin-uiju 
where ROK Navy Special Forces combatants will deploy. The information broker returns 








requested data and displays it on the Chinese Army Intelligence computer. The 
operations officer makes a plan to help the ROK Navy combatants escape safely after 
their mission. 
(2)  Step 2.  The China operations officer makes a query to the 
information broker requesting information on possible effects of radiation in the event 
that the mission fails. The information broker returns data files relating to CBR effects 
located in Gasmask.  After evaluating the threats of radiation contamination if the 
mission fails, the operations officer makes a plan to protect people in An-Tung from 
radioactive emissions.  
B. ASSESSMENT FOR THE SCENARIO 
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the technical feasibility of 
conducting a systematic formal approach using dRBAC. In addition, this section explains 
why dRBAC is appropriate for modeling information sharing for coalition environments. 
Security-enhanced use cases for information sharing have been examined in this thesis. 
Table 18 contains a summary of the roles introduced in the scenario. 
 
Role # Role Organization Description 
1 Agent NIS Responsible for gathering data from a satellite and 
analyzing intelligence associated with CBR warfare 
2 Operations officer ROK JCS  Responsible for analyzing intelligence associated with 
CBR warfare;  reports to UN 
3 Member UN Security Council Preparing for negotiations with North Korea over their 
nuclear weapons program  
4 Observer IAEA Checks information on the possibility that North 
Korea has a nuclear weapon 
5 Operations planner ROK NAVY 
Commands 
Tasked with determining options for destroying the 
suspected launching site for a nuclear-armed missile 
near Sin-uiju 
6 Operations officer  China Army 
Intelligence 
Responsible for evaluating negative effects if the 
mission fails and with helping ROK NAVY 
combatants escape safely. 
 








These scenarios are applied by dRBAC. The proof uses the model proposed by   
Freudenthal et al., which serves as the basis for analyzing the scenarios. Appendix B 
contains a description of the syntax of dRBAC policy. 
In the first step of sharing information in scenario 1, the NIS agent, Baek, is 
willing to get CBR information through the IB. The information comes from a CIA 
database. Table 19 shows the proof of delegations using RBAC policy. 
 
Phase 1, Step 3 
(1)[Baek → NIS.agent]NIS 
(2)[NIS.agent → CIA.agent  
with CIA.images = Korea area 
 and CIA.document = Korea area 
and CIA.secret-level <= Secret] CIA 
(3)[CIA.agent → CIA.DBmember  
with CIA.images = ‘ 
 and CIA.document = ‘ 
and CIA.secret-level <= ‘] CIA 
(4)[CIA.DBmember → CIA.access  
with CIA.images = Korea area 
 and CIA.document = Korea area 
and CIA.secret-level = Secret] CIA 
Result 
[Baek → CIA.access  
with CIA.images = Korea area 
 and CIA.document = Korea area 
and CIA.secret-level = Secret] CIA 
 
Table 19.   Delegation of Baek’s Access 
 
Delegation step (1) identifies Baek as an agent in NIS. In step 1, one can check 
authentication of Baek’s subject key. The IB compares the encrypted key with the subject 







coalition between the CIA and NIS as established by the CIA. Step (2) also provides 
limitations or restrictions as specified by the CIA. These limitations can be set, removed, 
or modified on a case-by-case basis depending on the strength or desired strength of the 
coalition. In this case, NIS Baek is authorized to view all the data that a CIA agent is 
entitled to see and the CIA agent is authorized to provide the delegation of permissions as 
described in delegation steps (3) - (4).  
Figure 18 is a distributed proof construction of all of the steps in the dRBAC 
process. This case study starts off with agent Baek from NIS establishing a connection to 
a CIA server to access information (Step 1). In this case the coalition role of "NIS" 
authenticates itself to CIA using a public-key cryptographic protocol and requests access 
to the data on Baek’s behalf by passing on delegation (1) which validates Baek as a NIS 
agent. To authorize access, the CIA server must find a proof for NIS.agent → 
CIA.access. Here, "→" means "have a permission of." When combined with delegation 
(1) it provides that Baek is authorized access to applicable CIA data (Baek → 
CIA.access). 
The CIA server queries its trusted local wallet for the requested proofs as seen in 
step 2. If it fails to find the proofs locally, the wallet attempts to discover the delegations 
necessary to build the proof. The wallet will contact the home wallet corresponding to the 
role NIS.agent, issue a query, and discover that there is a defined relationship between 
the roles NIS.agent and CIA.agent. The server wallet now has a chain from Baek to 
CIA.agent. There is still an outstanding requirement that would authorize CIA agents to 
the CIA database (CIA.agent → CIA.access). A direct query is issued for a subject to 
object search involving CIA.agent → CIA.access (Step 4). 
The results of the query are a self-certified delegation. This provides proofs 
showing that Baek has access to CIA data (Baek → CIA.access). In step 5, “[d]elegations 
from this proof are inserted into the local wallet, which is trusted to verify signatures and 
establish its own validation subscriptions.”13 At this point, limitations and restrictions can 
                                                 







be placed on access to data. In step 6, the proof is returned to the original requester and 
stored as an object. This object allows for the continuous monitoring of delegations 
authorizing Baek’s access. Such continuous monitoring could implement the temporal 
aspects of RBAC, providing limited access to data based on time. 
The same methods are used to prove the rest of permissions in information 








CIA.DBmember (4) CIA.DBmember →
CIA.access








? NIS.agent  
=> CIA.access 
















































V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis demonstrates an approach applying misuse cases to drive the 
specification of requirements for secure information sharing.  
A. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS 
The thesis presents an integrated system development and risk management 
process for development of secure information sharing. The proposed process consists of 
decomposing the main functions and analyzing their risks using misuse cases. Chapter III 
shows that the detection and mitigation of security obstacles do not require complex 
technical skills because use cases are focused on a high level of abstraction. In addition, 
the iterative development with sequence diagrams and secure-enhanced use case 
diagrams facilitates understanding of how the mitigation should be implemented.  
The research indicates that it is best to take an incremental approach to applying 
the dRBAC principle to solve a “need to share” problem. The dRBAC supports 
dissemination within a coalition of information. The roles created for coalition partners 
can have set limitations to control access to the information that they need to share. The 
creation of roles specific to a particular event or operation will be the baseline for 
controlling the flow of information to coalition partners. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
One area of future work is automated tool support. For example, a traceability 
tool for managing the relationships among use cases, misuse cases, and other system 
artifacts. Another area of further research to consider is that of metrics, specifically, 
metrics that capture the action of the information returned to the requestor. In addition, 
what types of feedback mechanisms can be put in place to assist in improving the action 































APPENDIX A. SYNTAX FOR THE BASE DRBAC DELEGATION 
MODEL 
Entities: A public key that represents a principal or a resource and defines a 
namespace that can contain roles. 
Form: cryptographic public key and a human-readable name. 
 Example: Kim; NIS 
Role:   A name within an Entity’s namespace. 
Form: Entity.LocalName 
Example: NIS.agent 
Role Delegations: Signed Certificates that extend access rights on some object to a 
subject. Access to an object by a subject can be extended by the 
issuer of the certificate. 
Form:[Subject → Object] Issuer 
 
dRBAC includes three major types of delegations: 
Self-certified Delegation: An Issuer A grants role A.a to some Subject. The role 
granted is defined within A’s namespace. 
Form:[Subject → A.a]A 
Example: [Kim → NIS.agent]NIS 
Assignment Delegation: Entity B grants some Subject the right to delegate Role A.a 
to others. The tick (‘) indicates that the Subject can further 
delegate the Role. B and A may or may not be the same 
entity. 
Form:[Subject → A.a’]B 
Example: [NIS.agent → NIS.DBmember’] NIS 
Third-Party Delegation: In third-party delegation, some Issuer B exercises their right 
to delegate a Role defined in A’s namespace. A and B are 
not the same Entity. 
Form:[Subject → A.a]B 
































APPENDIX B. PROOFS OF DELEGATIONS WITH DRBAC IN 
THE SCENARIO 
Step 2 
(1)[Kim → ROK JCS.operations officer]ROK JCS 
(2)[ROK JCS.operations officer → China.officer  
with China.air-quality = Korea area 
and China.secret-level <= TS] China 
(3)[China.officer → China-SEPA.account]China 
(4)[China-SEPA.account → China-SEPA.database  
with China.air-quality = ‘ 
and China.secret-level <= ‘] China 
(5)[China-SEPA.database → China-SEPA.access 
with China.air-quality = Sin-uiju 
and China.secret-level <= TS] CIA 
Result 
[Kim → China-SEPA.access 
with China.air-quality = Sin-uiju 
and China.secret-level <= TS] CIA  
 
Step 4 
[John → UN IAEA.observer]UN 
[UN IAEA.observer → US AIS.member  
with US AIS.images = Korea area 
and US AIS.data = Korea area 
and US AIS.secret-level <= TS] US AIS 
[US AIS.member → US AIS.database 
with US AIS.images = ‘ 
and US AIS.data = ‘ 
and US AIS.secret-level <= TS] US AIS 
[US AIS.database → US AIS.access 
with US AIS.images = ‘ 
and US AIS.data = ‘ 
and US AIS.secret-level <= TS] US AIS 
 
Result 
[John → US AIS.access 
with US AIS.images = ‘ 
and US AIS.data = ‘ 












[James → UN Security Council.member]UN 
[UN Security Council.member → NIS.agent  
with NIS.images = Korea area 
and NIS.air-quality = Korea area 
and NIS.secret-level <= TS] NIS 
[NIS.agent → NIS.database’  
with NIS.images = ‘ 
and NIS.air-quality = ‘ 
and NIS.secret-level >= TS] NIS 
[NIS.database → NIS.access’  
with NIS.images = Sin-uiju 
and NIS.air-quality = Sin-uiju 
and NIS.secret-level <= TS] NIS 
 
Result 
[James → NIS.access’  
with NIS.images = Sin-uiju 
and NIS.air-quality = Sin-uiju 




[Park→ ROK Navy.operations planner]ROK Navy 
[ROK Navy.operations planner → NIS.agent  
with NIS.images = Korea area 
and NIS.air-quality = Korea area 
and NIS.secret-level <= TS] NIS 
[NIS.agent → NIS.database’  
with NIS.images = ‘ 
and NIS.air-quality = ‘ 
and NIS.secret-level >= TS] NIS 
[NIS.database → NIS.access’  
with NIS.images = Sin-uiju 
and NIS.air-quality = Sin-uiju 
and NIS.secret-level <= TS] NIS 
 
Result 
[Park → NIS.access’  
with NIS.images = Sin-uiju 
and NIS.air-quality = Sin-uiju 










[Wang→ China Army.operations planner] China Army 
[China Army.operations planner → ROK Navy.member  
with ROK Navy.deployment = Speical Force in Sin-uiju 
and ROK Navy.secret-level <= TS] ROK Navy 
[ROK Navy.member → ROK Navy.database’  
with ROK Navy.deployment = ‘ 
and ROK Navy.secret-level <= TS] ROK Navy 
[ROK Navy.database → ROK Navy.access  
with ROK Navy.deployment = Special Force in Sin-uiju 
and ROK Navy.secret-level <= TS] ROK Navy 
 
Result 
[Wang → ROK Navy.access  
with ROK Navy.deployment = Special Force in Sin-uiju 

































LIST OF REFERENCES 
Alexander, Ian. “Misuse Case Help to Elicit Nonfunctional Requirements.” Computing 
and Control Engineering Journal, vol. 14, no. 1 (February 2003): 40-45. 
 
Alexander, I. "Misuse Cases: Use Cases with Hostile Intent." IEEE Software 
(January/February 2003): 58-66. 
 
Basin, David, Jürgen Doser and Torsten Lodderstedt. "Model driven security: From UML 
models to access control infrastructures." ACM Transactions on Software Engineering 
and Methodology, vol.15 no. 1 (January 2006): 39-91. 
 
Ferraiolo, D. F., R. Sandhu, S. Gavrila, D. R. Kuhn and R. Chandramouli. “Proposed 
NIST standard for role-based access control." ACM Transactions on Information and 
System Security, vol. 4, no. 3 (2001): 224-274. 
 
Freudenthal, Eric, Tracy Pesin, Lawrence Port, Edward Keenan, and Vijay Karamcheti. 
"dRBAC: Distributed Role-Based Access Control for Dynamic Coalition Environments."  
Proceedings of the 22nd IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing 
Systems, IEEE Vienna, Austria (2002): 411- 420. 
 
James X. Dempsey."Moving from 'Need to Know' to 'Need to Share:' A Review of the 9-
11 Commission's Recommendations." Center for Democracy & Technology, Retrieved 
July 2007, Available from http://www.cdt.org/testimony/20040803dempsey.shtml. 
 
McDaniel, C. R. and M. L. Tardy, "Role-Based Access Control for Coalition Partners in 
Maritime Domain Awareness." M.S. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
2005.   
 
Michael, James B., and Duminda Wijekera. "Secure Execution Framework for Active 
Coalition Partners in Maritime Domain Awareness." The CIP Report (January 2007): 8-9. 
 
Pauli, J. and D. Xu. “Integating Functional and Security Requirements with Use Case 
Decomposition.”  Proceedings of the 11th IEEE International Conference on 
Engineering of Complex Computer Systems, Palo Alto, CA (August 2006):57-66. 
 
Sandhu, R. S. and E. J. Coyne, “Role-Based Access Control Models,” Computer (Feb 
1996): 38-47. 
 
Sindre, G. and A. L. Opdahl. "Capturing Security Requirements through Misuse Cases." 









Sindre, G. and A. L. Opdahl, "Eliciting Security Requirements by Misuse Cases." 
Proceedings of the 37th Conference on Techniques of Object-Oriented Languages and 
Systems, IEEE, Sydney, Australia (2000): 120-131. 
 
Sindre, G. and A. L. Opdahl. “Templates for Misuse Case Description.” Proceeding of 
the 7th International Workshop on Requirements Engineering, Foundation for Software 
Quality, Interlaken, Switzerland (June 2001): 125-137. 
 
U.S. Department of State, "State Sponsors of Terrorism," Retrieved August 2007, 












INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  
 
3.       Army Headquarters Library 
The Republic of Korea Army 
Gye Ryong, Korea 
 
4.       Woo Dang Library 
Korea Military Academy 
Seoul, Korea 
     
5. Prof. J. Bret Michael 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
6. Prof. Duminda Wijesekera 
George Mason University 
Fairfax, VA 
 
7. Mr. Christopher Newcomb 
SPAWARSYSCOM Code 05 TENCAP West 
San Diego, CA 
 
8. Mr. Frederick Glaeser 
SPAWARSYSCOM Code 05 TENCAP West 
San Diego, CA 
 
9. Mr. James Mueller 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
10. Prof. Alan Ross 











11. Prof. Herschel Loomis 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
